Exit strategy or springboard for career development? The case of university executives' remuneration

HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY(2023)

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摘要
The steady increase of chief executives' compensation in both public and private universities has long been at the centre of public debate and has received a lot of criticism in the UK. As higher education is considered as an industry, a pay for performance relationship is expected. This paper differs by demonstrating that UK Vice Chancellors consider incentives other than remuneration in their career progression. By constructing a comprehensive dataset of UK Vice Chancellors covering academic years 2012/2013 to 2016/2017, we demonstrate that UK university chief executives, especially if young, are willing to accept lower salaries when they interpret their role as a springboard for visible high-profile positions in the public arena.
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关键词
executive compensation,higher education,pay for performance,principal-agent theory,visibility
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