Exit strategy or springboard for career development? The case of university executives' remuneration
HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY(2023)
摘要
The steady increase of chief executives' compensation in both public and private universities has long been at the centre of public debate and has received a lot of criticism in the UK. As higher education is considered as an industry, a pay for performance relationship is expected. This paper differs by demonstrating that UK Vice Chancellors consider incentives other than remuneration in their career progression. By constructing a comprehensive dataset of UK Vice Chancellors covering academic years 2012/2013 to 2016/2017, we demonstrate that UK university chief executives, especially if young, are willing to accept lower salaries when they interpret their role as a springboard for visible high-profile positions in the public arena.
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关键词
executive compensation,higher education,pay for performance,principal-agent theory,visibility
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