Demand Response Management in Time-Delayed Low Inertia Microgrids Against False Data Injection Cyberattack

Microgrids inherently are low inertia power systems. In addition, integration with power electronic interfaces renewable energy sources has significantly decreased their inertia. In such a system, demand response is used to create a balance between generation and consumption. Therefore, a fast and reliable communication infrastructure layer is vital. Fast communication and IEC 61850 protocols are used to address this issue, and all equipment is synchronized over the same time horizon. In such a system, delayed actions lose value, and wrong commands have destructive effects, leading to instability. Cyber attackers disrupt microgrid operations with false data injection commands. In order to address these problems, this paper presents a fractional-order model for a typical microgrid and proposes a novel Pade approximation based adaptive sliding mode observer for delay compensation, detect false data injection cyberattacks, optimal DR participation. Simulation results of load frequency control in a typical microgrid validate that the proposed novel method can quickly and accurately detect false data injection cyber-attacks and improve DR participation