The medical-nursing combined cooperation mechanism of residents-hospital-pension in stitutions-based on tripartite evolutionary game research

Abstract The combination of medical care and nursing enables the elderly to obtain continuous health care and medical services, which can help alleviate the phenomenon of medical resource crowding and make the elderly have a sense of security. This study uses game theory to explore how to consider various institutions for their own interests under the government's mandatory medical and nursing cooperation. We establish the expected income functions of medical institutions, pension institutions and residents respectively, and determine the optimal solution. In addition, we also analyzed the impact of the proportion of medical insurance reimbursement, the benefit distribution mechanism and the change of service value on the decision stability point. The results show that with the reduction of additional utility brought to no-buyers, residents will gradually choose to purchase integrated medical and nursing services. In addition, different benefit distribution mechanisms will have a significant impact on the cooperation intention of institutions. Change the proportion of medical insurance reimbursement, that is, the reduction of expenses is not highly attractive to residents. Finally, based on the research conclusions, some management suggestions are put forward for the cooperation between medical institutions and pension institutions.