Stealing Maggie's Secrets -- On the Challenges of IP Theft Through FPGA Reverse Engineering
CoRR(2023)
摘要
Intellectual Property (IP) theft is a cause for major financial and
reputational damage, reportedly in the range of hundreds of billions of dollars
annually in the U.S. alone. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are
particularly exposed to IP theft, because their configuration file contains the
IP in a proprietary format that can be mapped to a gate-level netlist with
moderate effort. Despite this threat, the scientific understanding of this
issue lacks behind reality, thereby preventing an in-depth assessment of IP
theft from FPGAs in academia. We address this discrepancy through a real-world
case study on a Lattice iCE40 FPGA found inside iPhone 7. Apple refers to this
FPGA as Maggie. By reverse engineering the proprietary signal-processing
algorithm implemented on Maggie, we generate novel insights into the actual
efforts required to commit FPGA IP theft and the challenges an attacker faces
on the way. Informed by our case study, we then introduce generalized netlist
reverse engineering techniques that drastically reduce the required manual
effort and are applicable across a diverse spectrum of FPGA implementations and
architectures. We evaluate these techniques on seven benchmarks that are
representative for different FPGA applications and have been synthesized for
Xilinx and Lattice FPGAs. Finally, we provide a comprehensive open-source
tool-suite of netlist reverse engineering techniques to foster future research,
enable the community to perform realistic threat assessments, and facilitate
the evaluation of novel countermeasures.
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