Securing AES Designs Against Power Analysis Attacks: A Survey

IEEE Internet of Things Journal(2023)

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摘要
With the advent of Internet of Things (IoT), the call for hardware security has been seriously demanding due to the risks of side-channel attacks from adversaries. Advanced encryption standard (AES) is the de facto security standard for such applications and needs to ensure a low power, low area, and moderate throughput design apart from providing high security to these devices. Substitution-box (S-box), being the core component of AES, has always drawn the attention of the cryptographic community. A chronological development of the S-box over a period of 20 years since the inception of AES is presented. This article provides the first comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art S-box design techniques, identifying current advancements and analyzing their impact on gate count, area, maximum frequency of operation, throughput, and power. The other goal of the survey is to study the countermeasures designed for AES to protect it against side-channel attacks. In particular, we consider the power analysis attacks (PAAs), and the countermeasures are investigated in terms of their security metrics and design overheads, such as area, power, and performance. The countermeasures are based on hiding or masking approaches depending on their design principle. Similar to the S-box survey, a chronological development of the countermeasures since the discovery of PAAs in 1999, is presented. Finally, we suggest some open research gaps and possible direction of research in terms of S-box and countermeasure designs.
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关键词
Advanced encryption standard (AES),counter measures,Galois field (GF),hiding,masking,Internet of Things (IoT),power analysis attacks (PAAs),substitution-box (S-box),VLSI
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