SQUIP: Exploiting the Scheduler Queue Contention Side Channel.

Modern superscalar CPUs have multiple execution units that independently execute operations from the instruction stream. Previous work has shown that numerous side channels exist around these out-of-order execution pipelines, particularly for an attacker running on an SMT core. In this paper, we present the SQUIP attack, the first side-channel attack on scheduler queues, which are critical for deciding the schedule of instructions to be executed in superscalar CPUs. Scheduler queues have not been explored as a side channel so far, as Intel CPUs only have a single scheduler queue, and contention thereof would be virtually the same as contention of the reorder buffer. However, the Apple M1, AMD Zen 2, and Zen 3 microarchitectures have separate scheduler queues per execution unit. We first reverse-engineer the behavior of the scheduler queues on these CPUs and show that they can be primed and probed. The SQUIP attack observes the occupancy level from within the same hardware core and across SMT threads. We evaluate the performance of the SQUIP attack in a covert channel, exfiltrating 0.89 Mbit/s from a co-located virtual machine at an error rate below 0.8 %, and 2.70 Mbit/s from a co-located process at an error rate below 0.8 %. We then demonstrate the side channel on an mbedTLS RSA signature process in a co-located process and in a co-located virtual machine. Our attack recovers full RSA4096 keys with only 50 500 traces and less than 5 to 18 bit errors on average. Finally, we discuss mitigations necessary, especially for Zen 2 and Zen 3 systems, to prevent our attacks.