Continuous Intrusion: Characterizing the Security of Continuous Integration Services.

Continuous Integration (CI) is a widely-adopted software development practice for automated code integration. A typical CI workflow involves multiple independent stakeholders, including code hosting platforms (CHPs), CI platforms (CPs), and third party services. While CI can significantly improve development efficiency, unfortunately, it also exposes new attack surfaces. As the code executed by a CI task may come from a less-trusted user, improperly configured CI with weak isolation mechanisms might enable attackers to inject malicious code into victim software by triggering a CI task. Also, one insecure stakeholder can potentially affect the whole process. In this paper, we systematically study potential security threats in CI workflows with multiple stakeholders and major CP components considered. We design and develop an analysis tool, CInspector, to investigate potential vulnerabilities in seven popular CPs, when integrated with three mainstream CHPs. We find that all CPs have the risk of token leakage caused by improper resource sharing and isolation, and many of them utilize overprivileged tokens with improper validity periods. We further reveal four novel attack vectors that allow attackers to escalate their privileges and stealthy inject malicious code by executing a piece of code in a CI task. To understand the potential impact, we conduct a large-scale measurement on the three mainstream CHPs, scrutinizing over 1.69 million repositories. Our quantitative analysis demonstrates that some very popular repositories and large organizations are affected by these attacks. We have duly reported the identified vulnerabilities to CPs and received positive responses.