Obligation, Overridingness, and Punishment

Abstract The overridingness thesis says that of the different sorts of obligation such as moral, legal, or prudential obligation, moral obligation is supreme or overriding. For instance, if at some time one morally ought to do something and one prudentially ought to do something else, but one cannot at this time do both, then one “plain ought” to do what morality requires. The thesis presupposes an “ought” (“plain ought”) that is distinct from the “ought” of ordinary normative standpoints, such as the moral, prudential, legal, or etiquettical standpoints. The chapter defends the view that determinism compromises “plain ought,” thereby calling into question the overridingness thesis. In addition, the chapter unearths an important implication of the argument developed in a previous chapter for the incompatibility of determinism and obligation. Some philosophers have proposed that there is no free will problem for punishment because attractive justifications of punishment, such as quarantine or apt deterrent justifications, are entirely divorced from blameworthiness. The chapter introduces a new free will obstacle for punishment that arises in virtue of the commitments of these justifications to moral obligation.