Alternate Possibility Arguments for Varieties of Incompatibilism

Abstract The chapter presents, explains, and evaluates two “alternate possibility” (AP) arguments, one for the incompatibility of determinism and obligation (AP-Obligation), and the other for the incompatibility of determinism and blameworthiness (AP-Blameworthiness). These arguments share the premise that if determinism is true, no one can do otherwise. The skeptical conclusions are reached by drawing on the intermediary premise that obligation and responsibility require freedom to do otherwise. Argument AP-Obligation appeals to the following two principles: if one ought to do something, then one can do it (OIC); and one ought to do something if, and only if, it is wrong for one not to do it (Equivalence). In addition to OIC and Equivalence, argument AP-Blameworthiness calls on a third principle: one is blameworthy for doing something only if it is wrong for one to do it (BRI). Frankfurt examples are examples that seek to show that moral responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise. The chapter explains why appropriately adjusted versions of such examples do not undermine AP-Obligation. The chapter concludes that even if Frankfurt examples have merit, determinism still imperils blameworthiness by precluding freedom to do otherwise because there are apt conceptual connections between blameworthiness and impermissibility.