Impact of dual credit policy on new energy vehicles technology innovation with information asymmetry

Promoting new energy vehicles (NEVs) is one of the most effective means to solve the increasingly severe energy shortage and environmental pollution problems. Considering the dual credit policy and carmakers having private information, we construct the Stackelberg game models to obtain the optimal technology innovation strategy for the NEVs production systems under information symmetry and information asymmetry. Then, we compare the optimal solutions in different situations obtaining some interesting conclusions. The results reveal that (1) the dual credit policy can promote technology innovation and improve the technical performance of NEVs. Moreover, the higher the credits price and the higher the technology innovation credit coefficient, the more significant the promotion effect. (2) When customers’ technology preference is low, information asymmetry weakens the incentive effect of the dual credit policy. With the increase of credit price or technology innovation credit coefficient, the weakening of the dual credit policy incentive effect by information asymmetry becomes more significant.