Improved Bound on the Local Leakage-resilience of Shamir's Secret Sharing.

Side-channel attacks have repeatedly falsified the assumption that cryptosystems are black boxes. Leakage-resilient cryptography studies the robustness of cryptographic constructions when an unforeseen revelation of information occurs. In this context, recently, Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai, and Rabin (CRYPTO–2018) motivated the study of the local leakage resilience of secret-sharing schemes against an adversary who obtains independent leakage from each secret share.Motivated by applications in secure computation, Benhamouda et al. (CRYPTO–2018) initiated the study of the local leakage resilience of Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme, an essential primitive for nearly all threshold cryptography. The objective is to achieve local leakage resilience with as small a fractional reconstruction threshold as possible. Previously, Benhamouda et al. showed that the reconstruction threshold k being at least 0.907 times the number of parties n is sufficient for Shamir’s secretsharing scheme to be resilient against arbitrary single-bit local leakage from each secret share. After that, Maji et al. (CRYPTO–2021) and Benhamouda et al. (Journal of Cryptology–2021) independently lowered this threshold to k/n ⩾ 0.8675 and k/n ⩾0.85, respectively.This paper contributes to this line of research and proves that k/n ⩾ 0.78 is sufficient. Next, motivated by applications in GMW-style leakage-resilient secure computation, our work extends this bound to a more general adversary who corrupts some parties (obtaining their entire secret shares) and obtains leakage from the remaining honest parties’ secret shares.Our technical analysis proceeds by Fourier analysis and accurately estimates an exponential sum arising in this analysis.