Efficient Protection Mechanism for CPU Cache Flush Instruction Based Attacks

CPU flush instruction-based cache side-channel attacks (cache instruction attacks) target a wide range of machines. For instance, Meltdown/ Spectre combined with FLUSH+RELOAD gain read access to arbitrary data in operating system kernel and user processes, which work on cloud virtual machines, laptops, desktops, and mobile devices. Addition-ally, fault injection attacks use a CPU cache. For instance, Rowhammer, is a cache instruction attack that attempts to obtain write access to arbitrary data in physical memory, and affects machines that have DDR3. To pro-tect against existing cache instruction attacks, various existing mechanisms have been proposed to modify hardware and software aspects; however, when latest cache instruction attacks are disclosed, these mechanisms can-not prevent these. Moreover, additional countermeasure requires long time for the designing and developing process. This paper proposes a novel mechanism termed FlushBlocker to protect against all types of cache in-struction attacks and mitigate against cache instruction attacks employ lat-est side-channel vulnerability until the releasing of additional countermea-sures. FlushBlocker employs an approach that restricts the issuing of cache flush instructions and the attacks that lead to failure by limiting control of the CPU cache. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this study, Flush -Blocker was implemented in the latest Linux kernel, and its security and performance were evaluated. Results show that FlushBlocker successfully prevents existing cache instruction attacks (e.g., Meltdown, Spectre, and Rowhammer), the performance overhead was zero, and it was transparent in real-world applications.