Ministers in Favoritism Too

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS(2022)

引用 0|浏览1
暂无评分
摘要
To study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries, we hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001-2015). Focusing on health outcomes, we provide causal evidence of favor-itism by health ministers and, less so, key ministers. Neonates' and infants' mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region, especially for children of vulnerable (rural-based or uneducated) mothers. Co-regional health ministers also increase healthcare access at birth, particularly for vulnerable mothers. Thus, healthcare access likely explains part of the mortality-lowering effects. We find evidence for ethnic motives playing a role in favoritism but not (short-run) electoral motives.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
更多
查看译文
关键词
Infant mortality,Child health,Favoritism,Political capture,Patronage,Corruption,Africa,Georeferenced data,Spatial analysis
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要