Exploring Phone-Based Authentication Vulnerabilities in Single Sign-On Systems

Matthew M. Tolbert, Elie M. Hess, Mattheus C. Nascimento,Yunsen Lei,Craig A. Shue

International Conference on Information and Communication Security (ICICS)(2022)

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摘要
Phone-based authenticators (PBAs) are commonly incorporated into multi-factor authentication and passwordless login schemes for corporate networks and systems. These systems require users to prove that they possess a phone or phone number associated with an account. The out-of-band nature of PBAs and their security may not be well understood by users. Further, the frequency of PBA prompts may desensitize users and lead to increased susceptibility to phishing or social engineering. We explore such risks to PBAs by exploring PBA implementation options and two types of attacks. When employed with a real-world PBA system, we found the symptoms of such attacks were subtle. A subsequent user study revealed that none of our participants noticed the attack symptoms, highlighting the limitations and risks associated with PBAs.
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关键词
authentication vulnerabilities,phone-based
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