Family CEO Duality, Temporal Conditions and Research and Development Investment Intensity in Family

Findings on family firms' research and development (R&D) investment intensity remain mixed, with few studies articulating the critical role of a power balance between CEOs and executive boards. In this research, we extend the stewardship and the conservation of resources (COR) theories and posit that family CEO duality (i.e., the family CEO serves as the chairman of the board) negatively relates to a family firm's R&D investment. We further propose that such a relationship depends on two temporal conditions: firm age and CEO succession. We tested our model with a longitudinal dataset comprising 528 public family firms (2008-2016) and found a negative relationship between duality and R&D investment intensity. We also found that firm age mitigates such a negative relationship. That is, an old family firm with duality intensifies R&D more than a young firm. However, a family firm with a dual CEO invests less in R&D in the situation of post-CEO succession than pre-CEO succession.