Ability of strong-pulse illumination to hack self-differencing avalanche photodiode detectors in a high-speed quantum-key-distribution system

Implementation of high-speed quantum key distribution (QKD) has become one of the major focuses in the field, which produces a high key-generation rate for applications. To achieve high-speed QKD, tailored tech-niques are developed and employed to quickly generate and detect quantum states. However, these techniques may introduce unique loopholes to compromise the security of QKD systems. In this paper, we investigate the loopholes of the self-differencing (SD) avalanche photodiode (APD) detector, typically used for high-speed detection in a QKD system, and demonstrate experimental testing of the SD APD detector under strong-pulse -illumination attack. This attack presents blinding stability and helps an eavesdropper to learn the secret key without introducing extra quantum bit rate error. Based on this testing, we propose a set of criteria for protecting SD APD detectors from the strong-pulse-illumination attack.