Promoting the Development of China's New Energy Vehicle Industry in the Subsidies Phase-Outs Era: A Study Based on Evolutionary Game Theory Method

In the context of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, developing new energy vehicles (NEVs) is an important direction to realize the low-carbon transformation of the transportation industry. Under the background of China’s subsidy policy phase-outs, a three-party evolutionary game model between the government, banks and auto manufacturers is constructed, and evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and the sensitivity of several typical parameters are simulated and discussed. Results demonstrate that: (1) there are five possible ESS in the early, middle and late stages of the development of the NEV industry; (2) the probability of an ideal event is positively correlated with the phase-out rate and the trading price of NEV points; (3) there is a threshold for the impact of the government incentives on the evolutionary results of the government and banks, beyond which the evolutionary process of the government and banks will be unstable; (4) the financing costs that the implementation of green credit can save for enterprises has a positive impact on the strategies of the government and enterprises, but have a small impact on banks. These findings can be referred by the government and related industries to promote the development of China’s NEV industry.