Entkräftung und Widerruf: Fügsame Überzeugungen im Zeitverlauf

A speaker’s retraction of her own previous testimony serves to defeat the reason for belief provided by her testimony in a distinctive way. In telling an addressee that p , the speaker purports to settle for the addressee the question whether p . In retracting her testimony, the speaker then revokes her settling of this question for the addressee, cancelling the addressee’s entitlement to pass the epistemic buck back to her should the content of her belief be challenged, and this entitlement is cancelled even if the addressee has good reason to believe that the speaker’s retraction is misguided or mistaken. Deferentially believing a speaker and allowing them to settle a theoretical question thus has a distinctive temporal and interpersonal character, requiring the addressee to assume that both she herself and the speaker will continue to do their part in the joint activity that is the addressee’s holding p true.