Disaster Lending: 'Fair' Prices, but 'Unfair' Access

Social Science Research Network(2020)

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摘要
We find the Small Business Administration's disaster-relief home loan program denies significantly more loans in areas with larger shares of minorities, subprime borrowers, and higher income inequality. We find that risk-insensitive loan pricing -- a feature present in many regulated and government-run lending programs -- is a primary driver of these disparities in access to credit. The differences in denial rates are disproportionately high compared to private-market lending and government-insured risk-sensitive loan pricing programs. Thus, despite ensuring fair prices, the use of risk-insensitive pricing may lead to unfair access to credit.
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