Labor Market Benefit of Disaggregated Disclosure†
SSRN Electronic Journal(2022)
摘要
Asymmetric information is a fundamental friction that results in mismatches and efficiency losses in the labor market. In this study, we posit that more disaggregated financial disclosure by a CEO candidate's prior employer can help the hiring firm better assess the possible fit between its operational needs and the candidate's skill set. Using a mandatory segment reporting reform in the United States (SFAS 131) as an exogenous shock to disclosure disaggregation, we find a significant increase in the firm-CEO match quality when the hiring firm has access to more disaggregated segment information about the external candidate's past employment. Furthermore, the improvement in firm-CEO matching is greater when segment information is incrementally more useful for evaluation of candidate skills. These findings reveal a novel labor market benefit of disaggregated financial disclosure: alleviating pre-hiring information deficiencies and facilitating efficient allocation of CEO talent across firms.
更多查看译文
关键词
asymmetric information,disclosure disaggregation,matching,labor market frictions,CEO hiring,executive labor market
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要