A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE TEPPER SCHOOL OF BUSINESS IN PARTIAL FULFUILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Field of Accounting By Guoyu Lin Dissertation Committee: John O’Brien (Chair)

Carlos Corona, Mei Feng, Pierre Liang, Guoyu Lin, John O’Brien, Pietro Bonaldi, Lin Cheng, Harry Evans, Pingyang Gao, Jonathan Glover,Steve Karolyi,Jing Li, Thomas Rucht, Jack Stecher, Hyun Hwang, Eunhee Kim, Ryan Kim, Yi Liang, Lufei Ruan, Phong Trong,Aluna Wang, Sang Wu, Wenjie Xue, Yazhou Lin, Lingling Lin, Guowei Lin, Guoxiang Lin

semanticscholar（2020）

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摘要

A unique feature of the outside director market is that a director usually simultaneously works for several companies. In this paper, based on the linear-exponential-neutral (LEN) framework, I find that the relationship between optimal incentives (pay-performance sensitivity) and the number of directorships is always positive, no matter efforts across directorships are substitutive or complementary.

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