Novel Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic (SMCL) for Energy-Efficient and DPA-Resistant Design

SN Comput. Sci.(2021)

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摘要
Hybrid MTJ/CMOS-based Logic-in-Memory (LiM) architecture-based circuits show high potential in designing low-power circuits by reducing the leakage power. In this work, we have proposed a novel energy-efficient and Secure MTJ/CMOS Logic (SMCL) circuits to design ultra-low-power and DPA-resistant MTJ/CMOS circuits. Similar to the existing MTJ/CMOS designs, the proposed MTJ/CMOS design also works in two different modes of clock. The proposed MTJ/CMOS designs have considerable power savings during the pre-charge of the clock. During the pre-charge phase, both output nodes are pre-charged to VDD/2, while during the evaluate phase, one node will be charged to VDD, while the other node will discharged to ground. Moreover, the proposed SMCL consumes uniform power by masking the MTJ during the write operation from the power supply, thereby thwarting the power analysis-based side-channel attacks. From our simulations, we have observed that the proposed SMCL-based PRESENT-80 cryptographic hardware has about 42% and 59% of energy savings as compared to the PCSA-based MTJ/CMOS and conventional CMOS-based implementation. Furthermore, we have also performed the DPA attack on the SMCL-based PRESENT-80 and the secret key was not revealed after 16,000 power traces.
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关键词
Cryptography,Hardware security,Logic-in-memory (LiM) circuits,Low-energy computation,Magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ),Side-channel attacks
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