Subgame-perfect equilibria in mean-payoff games
LOGICAL METHODS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE(2023)
摘要
. In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, whose status was left open in the literature, is decidable.
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关键词
Games on graphs,subgame-perfect equilibria,mean-payoff objectives
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