Negative Correlation, Non-Linear Filtering, And Discovering Of Repetitiveness For Cache Timing Channel Detection

Physically shared micro-architecture can be exploited by adversaries to communicate covertly via timing modulation without leaving any physical traces. Among different micro architecture units, caches provide one of the largest attack surfaces because it is frequently accessed by multiple processes and it cannot be disabled. In this work, we show that by collecting cache occupancy traces, we can distinguish adversary from benign workloads through multiple signal processing techniques. When two processes are communicating by creating conflict misses, they would take cache memory space from each other. Consequently. the cache occupancies of two involved processes would be negatively correlated. Besides, the activity of the adversary in occupying the victim's cache space would be repetitive as a result of long-term, continuous transmission of secret information in a covert manner. By filtering the non-negatively correlated part and analyzing the repetitiveness of cache occupancy trace, we can achieve zero false negative rate and 4% false positive rate in cache timing channel detection.