Measuring the Deterrence Value of Securing Maritime Supply Chains against WMD Transfer and Measuring Subsequent WMD Risk Reduction

IntroductionThe security of the international maritime supply chain is vital to the economic well-being of the United States. The National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security,1 Maritime Commerce Security Plan,2 and other national strategies emphasize the importance of supply chain integrity to economic prosperity. Thus, we want to protect the supply chain from overt disruptions such as direct attacks on ports.However, supply chain security is also important for a different reason: to prevent its exploitation by way of smuggling illicit materials and people into the United States. Other strategies such as the National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,3 and reports such as Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows,4 emphasize the attractiveness of supply chain exploitation to criminal and terrorist elements. This includes possible of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) into the United States, with the intent to detonate it in an inland city. While this is not the same problem as a direct supply chain disruption, the consequences of an inland WMD detonation are extremely important to address.To address this issue, technology analysis, and modeling and simulation coupled with risk analysis, can help us determine where supply chains are susceptible to exploitation by WMD transfer. This can help us think about where to place limited resources to mitigate this susceptibility. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan advocates:Maritime security now involves risks that must be met with a layered approach that identifies and interdicts the threat as far as possible from the U.S. borders. A potential worst case scenario is the risk that a weapon of mass destruction is concealed in a container. Such a threat has severe consequences and must be detected as early as possible. A successful strategy will use risk management to align capabilities with threats to achieve the optimal response and protect the nation.5It can be debated whether a shipping container is the most likely mechanism for smuggling a WMD into the U.S. Nonetheless, analyzing the risk of WMD smuggled in shipping containers is one possible approach to reducing WMD transfer risk, since shipping containers carry much of the goods shipped internationally via maritime conveyance. Before we propose an approach to do this, we review existing and emerging WMD detection technology, risk analysis, and modeling/simulation initiatives.Existing and Emerging Technological SolutionsThe Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agency, has for the last several years managed the implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). The GNDA is a multilayered framework of radiological and nuclear weapon detection technologies and coordinating mechanisms, both within the United States and overseas.6 Example initiatives include:* The Department of Energy (DOE) Megaports initiative leverages technology to identify and screen high risk cargo shipments overseas, before they depart enroute U.S. ports.7* Customs and Border Protection (CBPu0027s) Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) leverage technology to detect the presence of radioactive material in cargo shipments, primarily in U.S. ports.8* U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) officers, equipped with radiation detection equipment, board vessels to ensure security and verify compliance with various regulations.9One emerging technology is the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitor (ASP) initiative. This initiative was intended to replace the existing RPMs, which only detect a radiological or nuclear signature. Then, secondary screening must be performed to identify the source of the signature. In contrast, the ASPs were intended to provide both a primary and a secondary screening function.10 However, this technology has had some challenges to implementation, as detailed in a National Academies report. …