The Price of Indivisibility in Cake Cutting.

We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has focused on two distinct classes of solutions to this problem - allocations which give each player a continuous piece of cake and allocations which give each player arbitrarily many disjoint pieces of cake. Our aim is to investigate allocations between these two extremes by parameterizing the maximum number of disjoint pieces each player may receive. We characterize the Price of Indivisibility (POI) as the gain achieved in social welfare (utilitarian and egalitarian), by moving from allocations which give each player a continuous piece of cake to allocations that may give each player up to $k$ disjoint pieces of cake. Our results contain bounds for the Price of Indivisibility for utilitarian as well as egalitarian social welfare, and for envy-free cake cutting as well as cake cutting without any fairness constraints.