Buffer Size for Routing Limited-Rate Adversarial Traffic

We consider the slight variation of the adversarial queuing theory model, in which an adversary injects packets with routes into the network subject to the following constraint: For any link e, the total number of packets injected in any time window [t,t') and whose route contains e, is at most ρ(t'-t)+σ, where ρ and σ are non-negative parameters. Informally, ρ bounds the long-term rate of injections and σ bounds the "burstiness" of injection: σ=0 means that the injection is as smooth as it can be. It is known that greedy scheduling of the packets (under which a link is not idle if there is any packet ready to be sent over it) may result in Ω(n) buffer size even on an n-line network and very smooth injections (σ=0). In this paper we propose a simple non-greedy scheduling policy and show that, in a tree where all packets are destined at the root, no buffer needs to be larger than σ+2ρ to ensure that no overflows occur, which is optimal in our model. The rule of our algorithm is to forward a packet only if its next buffer is completely empty. The policy is centralized: in a single step, a long "train" of packets may progress together. We show that in some sense central coordination is required, by presenting an injection pattern with σ=0 for the n-node line that results in Ω(n) packets in a buffer if local control is used, even for the more sophisticated "downhill" algorithm, which forwards a packet only if its next buffer is less occupied than its current one.