China’s Securities reforms and IPO wealth loss

We revisit initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in China before and after the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission reforms targeting the IPO process and strengthening corporate governance, using Habib and Ljungqvist’s (2001) wealth loss measure instead of headline underpricing. Habib and Ljungqvist argue that the extent to which owners care about underpricing depends on both headline underpricing and the percentage of IPO shares issued relative to total shares outstanding. We find that in the post-reform period, relative to the pre-reform period, the wealth loss for pre-IPO owners is lower, the incremental effect of the association between wealth loss and state-retained ownership is significantly positive, and a higher proportion of independent directors on the board moderates the wealth loss. Our findings suggest that the more market-oriented IPO process and the corporate governance reforms provide insiders of Chinese IPO firms with greater opportunities to influence IPO pricing and thereby reduce their wealth loss.