The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy

The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy Edited by Asaf Siniver Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013 331 pages $35.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] This book is a collection of essays on the very subject of the tide. As such, there is very little--if any--discussion of the military aspects of the October War of 1973. The book essentially seeks to present a new dimension to the war by focussing on its diplomatic, political and cultural aspects, and in this regard it both succeeds and fails. Problems always occur when attempting to understand the history of the 1973 war, even the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has yet to produce a definitive and agreed upon version of events (only it has any real access to the data), leaves the current military histories of the 1973 war rather lacking in all but the most obvious and widely agreed detail. The other aspect often forgotten is the history of this war is sometimes hostage to the political opinions of the authors. This book seems to take quite a left-wing view of events. However, that should not discourage readers from making an objective assessment of the views the book presents. The book spans the incredible breadth of the subject matter, and even if some of the conjectures and facts are perhaps too colored by political opinion, it is a valuable addition to the library of anyone studying the 1973 war. This problem does not obscure the need to assess some of the booku0027s contentions. Two of the chapters on the cultural and social memory and/or narrative of the war seem out of place in the book, and lack any sound military understanding or perspective. For example, current scholarship is beginning to reveal the IDF was not as un-prepared as most have come to believe. Firstly, the IDF was largely configured to meet a surprise attack, but the problem was not everyone understood the plan, or when the attack came it was not a raid or incursion, but a fully-fledged theatre offensive attempting to destroy Israeli formations and take ground. Thus, to claim the surprise and violence of the Egyptian and Syrian attacks created "shock" misses the point; the war ended with Syriau0027s almost complete defeat, and Israeli forces within Egypt able to threaten Cairo. Ultimately, the surprise failed. Whatever anyone wishes to assert as Sadatu0027s motivation for the war, he did not foresee the outcome being a demilitarized Sinai gained at enormous cost or a peace treaty with Israel that would ultimately claim his life and spark a border war with Libya in 1977. …