Congestion-Aware Rebalancing and Vehicle-to-Grid Coordination of Shared Electric Vehicles: An Aggregative Game Approach

Due to the increasing popularity of shared mobility and the ongoing transition towards transportation electrification, the coordination of ride-sourcing markets and electric mobility allows for the provision of various services to achieve societal optimum. This study presents a game-theoretic model for heterogeneous electric vehicles (EVs) to participate in vehicle rebalancing and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services. The game-theoretic model takes into account the competition among EV drivers, the resource limitations of public infrastructure, and the coordination of power system operators. Specifically, the routing and discharging decisions of independent EV users are constrained by the capacity limitations of road segments and charging stations. The individual decision-making process is affected by the overall population behavior and captured by an aggregative game framework. By leveraging variational inequality and monotone operator theory, the existence of a variational equilibrium for the proposed game is analyzed. To protect the personal information of EV drivers, a semi-decentralized equilibrium seeking algorithm with convergence guarantee is employed. Numerical analysis is conducted on the Nguyen-Dupuis traffic network and IEEE 33-bus power distribution network. The results demonstrate that the coordination of rebalancing and V2G services can enhance the efficiency of both transportation and power systems.