Altruism Improves Congestion in Series-Parallel Nonatomic Congestion Games
arxiv(2024)
摘要
Self-interested routing polices from individual users in a system can
collectively lead to poor aggregate congestion in routing networks. The
introduction of altruistic agents, whose goal is to benefit other agents in the
system, can seemingly improve aggregate congestion. However, it is known in
that in some network routing problems, altruistic agents can actually worsen
congestion compared to that which would arise in the presence of a
homogeneously selfish population. This paper provides a thorough investigation
into the necessary conditions for altruists to be guaranteed to improve total
congestion. In particular, we study the class of series-parallel non-atomic
congestion games, where one sub-population is altruistic and the other is
selfish. We find that a game is guaranteed to have improved congestion in the
presence of altruistic agents (even if only a small part of the total
population) compared to the homogeneously selfish version of the game, provided
the network is symmetric, where all agents are given access to all paths in the
network, and the series-parallel network for the game does not have
sub-networks which emulate Braess's paradox – a phenomenon we refer to as a
Braess-resistant network. Our results appear to be the most complete
characterization of when behavior that is designed to improve total congestion
(which we refer to as altruism) is actually guaranteed to do so.
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