Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY(2024)

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摘要
We introduce the notion of expectational equilibrium in a general specification of the many-toone matching with contracts model. The endogenous variables in an expectational equilibrium are expectations about tradable contracts. Expectational equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to stable outcomes. Expectational equilibrium unifies all the other approaches used in the literature so far, in particular Walrasian equilibrium, Dreze equilibrium, and market clearing cutoffs. It also applies to cases where contracts do not involve money as well as cases where there is a smallest monetary unit of account.
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关键词
Matching,Competitive equilibrium,Stable outcomes,Expectational equilibrium
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