An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design
arxiv(2024)
摘要
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off
between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to
develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to
grasp for imperfectly rational agents, but also understand the ensuing
limitations on the class of mechanisms that enforce it. In this context, the
concept of OSP mechanisms has assumed a prominent role since they provably
account for the absence of contingent reasoning skills, a specific cognitive
limitation. For single-dimensional agents, it is known that OSP mechanisms need
to use certain greedy algorithms.
In this work, we introduce a notion that interpolates between OSP and SOSP, a
more stringent notion where agents only plan a subset of their own future
moves. We provide an algorithmic characterization of this novel class of
mechanisms for single-dimensional domains and binary allocation problems, that
precisely measures the interplay between simplicity and implementability. We
build on this to show how mechanisms based on reverse greedy algorithms
(a.k.a., deferred acceptance auctions) are algorithmically more robust to
imperfectly rationality than those adopting greedy algorithms.
更多查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要