Density and Affinity Dependent Social Segregation and Arbitrage Equilibrium in a Multi-class Schelling Game
arxiv(2024)
摘要
Contrary to the widely believed hypothesis that larger, denser cities promote
socioeconomic mixing, a recent study (Nilforoshan et al. 2023) reports the
opposite behavior, i.e. more segregation. Here, we present a game-theoretic
model that predicts such a density-dependent segregation outcome in both one-
and two-class systems. The model provides key insights into the analytical
conditions that lead to such behavior. Furthermore, the arbitrage equilibrium
outcome implies the equality of effective utilities among all agents. This
could be interpreted as all agents being equally "happy" in their respective
environments in our ideal society. We believe that our model contributes
towards a deeper mathematical understanding of social dynamics and behavior,
which is important as we strive to develop more harmonious societies.
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