A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Voting: An Axiomatic Exploration
CoRR(2024)
摘要
Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative
committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly
focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation
during preference collection. In order to mitigate manipulation and increase
the cost associated with it, we propose the introduction of multiple stages in
the voting procedure, leading to the development of a unified framework of
multi-stage multi-winner voting rules. To shed light on this framework of
voting methods, we conduct an axiomatic study, establishing provable conditions
for achieving desired axioms within our model. Our theoretical findings can
serve as a guide for the selection of appropriate multi-stage multi-winner
voting rules.
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