Partition-form Cooperative Games in Two-Echelon Supply Chains
International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems(2024)
摘要
Competition and cooperation are inherent features of any multi-echelon supply
chain. The interactions among the agents across the same echelon and that
across various echelons influence the percolation of market demand across
echelons. The agents may want to collaborate with others in pursuit of
attracting higher demand and thereby improving their own revenue. We consider
one supplier (at a higher echelon) and two manufacturers (at a lower echelon
and facing the customers) and study the collaborations that are `stable'; the
main differentiator from the existing studies in supply chain literature is the
consideration of the following crucial aspect – the revenue of any
collaborative unit also depends upon the way the opponents collaborate. Such
competitive scenarios can be modeled using what is known as partition form
games.
Our study reveals that the grand coalition is not stable when the product is
essential and the customers buy it from any of the manufacturers without a
preference. The supplier prefers to collaborate with only one manufacturer, the
one stronger in terms of market power; further, such collaboration is stable
only when the stronger manufacturer is significantly stronger. Interestingly,
no stable collaborative arrangements exist when the two manufacturers are
nearly equal in market power.
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