The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk
CoRR(2023)
摘要
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk
equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how
much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the
standard unmediated model. We focus on a setting where a fully informed sender
without commitment power must disclose its information to influence the
behavior of a self-interested receiver. We show that, in the case of binary
actions, even though a mediator does not help neither the sender nor the
receiver directly, it may still allow improving the payoff of an external
decision-maker whose utility is affected by the realized state and the
receiver's action. Moreover, we show that if there are more than two actions,
there exist games in which both the sender and the receiver simultaneously
benefit from mediation.
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