Analysis and Design of Markets for Tradable MobilityCredit Schemes

Tradable mobility credit (TMC) schemes are an approach to travel demand management that have received significant attention in the transportation domain in recent years as a promising means to mitigate the adverse environmental, economic and social effects of urban traffic congestion. In TMC schemes, a regulator provides an initial endowment of mobility credits (or tokens) to all potential travelers. In order to use the transportation system, travelers need to spend a certain amount of tokens (tariff) that could vary with their choice of mode, route, departure time etc. The tokens can be bought and sold in a market that is managed by and operated by a regulator at a price that is dynamically determined by the demand and supply of tokens. This paper proposes and analyzes alternative market models for a TMC system (focusing on market design aspects such as allocation/expiration of credits, rules governing trading, transaction costs, regulator intervention, price dynamics), and develops a methodology to explicitly model the disaggregate behavior of individuals within the market. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted within a departure time context for the morning commute problem to compare the performance of the alternative designs relative to congestion pricing and a no control scenario. The simulation experiments employ a day to day assignment framework wherein transportation demand is modeled using a logit-mixture model and supply is modeled using a standard bottleneck model. The paper addresses a growing and imminent need to develop methodologies to realistically model TMCs that are suited for real-world deployments and can help us better understand the performance of these systems and the impact in particular, of market dynamics.