Actions are authentic, but are leaders? A reconceptualization of authenticity and leadership practice

Since the Gallup Leadership Summit, authentic leadership has ascended as a central topic of inquiry owing to practitioners and academicians' desire for more positive types of leadership (Braun & Peus, 2018; Ilies et al., 2005; Luthans & Avolio, 2003; Weiss et al., 2018). Like much of the extant literature, our article centers on authentic leadership as defined and operationalized by Walumbwa et al.'s (2008) four-part framework, which views authentic leaders as individuals who possess high levels of (a) self-awareness, (b) balanced processing, (c) relational transparency, and (d) having an internalized moral perspective. This definition originated from positive psychology and gained popularity, in part, because it offers a morally grounded response for organizations seeking to rebuild confidence, hope, and optimism amid growing corporate and societal problems (e.g., Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Avolio et al., 2004). As a result, scholarly research on authentic leadership has surged (see Gardner et al., 2011, for a review), quickly gaining traction with a wide array of stakeholders who desire leaders that promote behavioral integrity (Leroy et al., 2012), encourage creativity (Semedo et al., 2017), and foster intra-team trust as well as helping behaviors (Hirst et al., 2016). 1 Despite growing interest in authentic leadership, scholars have reviewed and critiqued the construct before raising theoretical and empirical concerns (Einola & Alvesson, 2021; Gardiner, 2015; Sidani & Rowe, 2018). Prior critiques have challenged authentic leadership's contextual grounding, leader-centric ideologies, definitional ambiguity, morality emphasis, and view of a true self (Crawford et al., 2020; Ladkin & Spiller, 2013; Vendette et al., 2022). Further issues raised questions about authentic leadership's unique value over and above other more heavily researched leadership styles (Banks et al., 2016) as well as show the construct's misguided roots in positive psychology (Alvesson & Einola, 2019). With regard to this latter point, the significance of what it means to be authentic originated from the philosophical movement of existentialism, 2 including the works of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. However, authenticity in a leadership context has been more predominately positioned in positive psychology, gaining popularity along with the positive movement in organizational studies. Indeed, as Iszatt-White and Kempster (2019) have remarked, the authentic leadership construct is entrenched in a “somewhat superficial” and “one-sided” interpretation of authenticity from positive psychology (p. 360). Positive psychology's hold on authenticity is the “antithesis” of existential forms of leadership as its idealized description neglects how authenticity is enacted and discounts the diversity of lived experience (Tomkins & Simpson, 2015, p. 1023). We argue that positive psychology's misinterpretation of existential authenticity not only explains why researchers continue to conflate authentic actions with authentic leaders but also calls into question authentic leadership as a theory and construct more broadly. The abovementioned issues underlie the central purpose of this point-counterpoint discussion, which is to illustrate that authenticity of action is distinct and adds value beyond that of authentic leadership. Despite preceding critiques, to date, scholarly interest in authentic leadership research appears to be accelerating, not stalling. Thus, in an effort to explain why authentic leadership studies will face continued criticism, we retrace authenticity's theoretical foundations to shed light on the conceptual, definitional, and empirical issues stemming from its positive psychology origins. While the critiques of authentic leadership are plentiful and growing, we are the first to show that the authentic leadership construct was handicapped from its inception by opening the proverbial “black box” and uncovering the root of what happened. Our interest in this regard is sparked by Suddaby's (2010) realization that when researchers “cannot agree on or communicate the basic elements of a phenomenon, the accumulation of knowledge cannot occur … and organizational knowledge becomes increasingly fragmented” (pp. 352–353). We thus scrutinize the authentic leadership construct, therein identifying meaningful misdirections in extant work so that our field may advance more useful theory development (e.g., Sandberg & Alvesson, 2021). In doing so, we contribute to the literature by hopefully (a) encouraging scholars to reconsider the blanket use of commonly accepted measures that exist within the authentic leadership arena and (b) stimulating theoretical and methodological advancements for “authentic” leadership research. Ideally speaking, theory and empirical concerns should inform the development of new constructs. This is because construct validity stems from one's ability to express concepts into variables and, in turn, variables into instruments (Suddaby, 2010). Despite 15 years of research, there remains considerable confusion regarding the theoretical meaning that underlies authentic leadership's predominant measure, the Authentic Leadership Questionnaire (ALQ, see Walumbwa et al., 2008). Such confusion is unfortunate because until researchers clearly define and operationalize the authentic leadership phenomenon, published works will face continued criticism and the knowledge transfer between organizational scientists and practitioners will lose pace. We therefore begin by revisiting the theoretical beginnings of authenticity research in an effort to better understand the evolutionary development of the authentic leadership construct. During the early 20th century, the concept of authenticity and what it means to “live an authentic life” gained considerable interest among existential theorists. Existentialism is not a homogeneous theory, but the literature blossomed during the postmodern movement where two influential philosophers, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, contributed their individual viewpoints (Algera & Lips-Wiersma, 2012; Ciullia, 2013). As one might expect Sartre and Heidegger's philosophies are not identical, although their characterizations of authenticity share marked similarities (Lawler & Ashman, 2012). Consequently, our work draws from Sartre and Heidegger's philosophies, wherein they describe what it means to live authentically. To begin, both Sartre and Heidegger contend that individual choice is a critical factor to being authentic; in short, they assert that it is the actions of an individual that defines who they are and creates meaning in one's life. Sartre's (1956) concept of authenticity stems from the notion of freedom, bad (good) faith, and the look of another whereas Heidegger (1962) uses the concepts of anxiety, fallenness, being, and Das Man (Dasein) in his depiction. For Sartre, individuals possess complete freedom over their choices where they first come into existence and then continually define themself through action. Sartrean philosophy does not view individuals as pre-destined for specific paths, but rather posits that each individual is responsible for their own actions and choices (which embody how they live in this world). Thus, to paraphrase a well-cited Sartrean phrase, individuals are merely what they make of themselves. Heidegger also embraces the importance of choice by viewing authenticity as an overarching state of Being 3 that looks upon an individual's collective actions over time. Heideggerian philosophy suggests that individuals can introspectively assess whether they were authentic through moments of anxiety by reflecting on how they acted and for whom. For Heidegger, authenticity is based on a historical assessment where either an individual (a) acted for themself (the Self) or (b) submitted to and consequently acted for some external force—a concept referred to as the Other or the They-self. To illustrate the concepts of the Self and Other in a leadership context, we review how authenticity-inauthenticity tensions co-exist and inform whether a leader acted authentically. Sartre and Heidegger agree that authenticity and inauthenticity are not mutually exclusive principles as individuals will act both authentically and inauthentically during their life. A leader acts authentically when they resist the external pressure from the Other and chooses to act according to their own desires. In an organizational context, the Other might represent (a) the firm's cultural norms, (b) a team's social context and related members' expectations of the leader, and/or (c) the demands and whims from a leader's higher-level supervisor, and so on. The prevalence and pull of the Other is strong which often pushes leaders to act inauthentically. However, when leaders act of their own volition, they are making an intentional decision to behave authentically, and it is through these choices that leaders can themselves become more or less authentic. Restated, the key to understanding whether a leader acted authentically is assessing whether they made choices that aligned with the Self (authentic) or the Other (inauthentic). Having briefly reviewed the historical (and philosophical) origins of authenticity, we wish to summarize a couple of key observations. First, leaders are incapable of achieving complete authenticity because, as an idealized state of Being, it is something that they are continuously moving towards (or away from). The authenticity of a leader ebbs and flows as their actions begin to align more (or less) with the attributed value systems held by the inauthentic Other versus the authentic Self. That is why authenticity is frequently described as a relative state wherein leaders can only achieve a certain level of authenticity, never becoming wholly authentic (Erickson, 1995). It therefore follows that authenticity should not be interpreted as a binary, either-or condition (i.e., a leader is either authentic or inauthentic); authenticity resides in a leader's act or choice itself rather than the leader per se. Second, authenticity and inauthenticity are not opposing ideals, but rather co-existing opposites as leaders may act authentically or inauthentically depending on each situated context. This juxtaposition between living an authentic versus inauthentic existence is an ever-present consideration that leaders contend with on a day-to-day basis. Given the salience of social pressure and the tendency to conform, existentialists contend that a true authentic existence is much less common than an inauthentic one. In sum, how existential theorists characterize (in)authenticity resonated with organizational scholars and contributed to our understanding of leadership theory (Bradley-Cole, 2021; Heil, 2013; Tomkins & Simpson, 2015). As the pioneering researchers, Walumbwa et al. (2008) were faced with a key decision regarding which theoretical foundation they would utilize when developing the authentic leadership construct. It was imperative for Walumbwa et al. (2008) to be explicit about their selection—and they were. Walumbwa et al. (2008) selected Avolio, Gardner, and colleagues (e.g., Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Gardner et al., 2005) along with Ilies et al.'s (2005) 4 scholarship as the theoretical foundation for authentic leadership and its survey instrument, the ALQ. They provided three reasons as to why these prior works provide the conceptual underpinnings needed to validly define and operationalize the authentic leadership construct. First, Walumbwa et al. (2008) indicated that Avolio, Gardner, Ilies and colleagues provided a perspective of authentic leadership that was “firmly rooted in the extant social psychology theory and research on authenticity” (p. 93). As they explain, social psychologists, including Kernis (2003) and Deci and Ryan (2000), had “clarified” and “refined” the construct of authenticity. For example, Ilies et al. (2005) ground their conceptualization of authentic leadership within Kernis' (2003) multicomponent perspective of authentic functioning, described as “the unobstructed operation of one's true, or core, self in one's daily enterprise” (p. 376). Following suit, Walumbwa et al. (2008) concluded that as leaders come to know themselves, they will display behaviors that are consistent with their underlying values and beliefs (i.e., authentic behavior) which, in turn, facilitates optimal levels of leader self-esteem and well-being. Second, on the basis of positive psychology principles, Walumbwa et al. (2008) advance Gardner et al.'s (2005) argument that an authentic leadership pre-requisite is to have an advanced level of internalized moral character. They note that because leading others involves ethical choices, the authentic leadership construct cannot be neutrally valenced, in the same way that Burns characterized transformational leaders as having high moral character (see Walumbwa et al., 2008, p. 94, as cited in Gardner et al., 2005). Finally, Walumbwa et al. (2008) contend that authentic leadership includes an overt focus on leader–follower development, reasoning that authentic leadership is “state-like and ultimately something one can develop in leaders” (p. 93). Instead of drawing on authenticity's existential origins when developing the authentic leadership construct, Walumbwa et al. (2008) remark that their work is firmly grounded in Kernis' (2003) social psychological concept of authentic functioning (see also Gardner et al., 2011). A review of Kernis' (2003) seminal work reveals, however, that it too leverages existential tenets—in fact, Kernis and colleagues tout authenticity's philosophical roots by suggesting that it is “firmly entrenched” in “existentialism” and “localized to specific authors like Sartre or Heidegger” (Kernis & Goldman, 2006, p. 284). Given Walumbwa et al.'s (2008) reliance on Kernis' (2003) conceptualization of authenticity, it is unclear (to us at least) why they pivoted from authenticity's existential origins and key assumptions. Moreover, a comparative review of Kernis' (2003) concept of authentic functioning and the conceptualization and operationalization of the authentic leadership construct yields additional divergences. According to Kernis (2003), authentic functioning has four discriminable components: (a) awareness, (b) unbiased processing, (c) action, and (d) relational authenticity (pp. 13–16). In short, the awareness component involves understanding and trusting in one's own feelings, motives and desires; these include, for example, being aware of one's strengths and weaknesses, traits, and feelings. Second, the unbiased processing component involves individuals fully embracing all self-relevant information as opposed to distorting, denying, or ignoring information that represents their negative aspects or characteristics. For example, akin to an ego defense mechanism, the unbiased processing component illustrates whether individuals can accept their weaknesses, instead of rationalizing these weaknesses or demeaning their importance altogether. Third, the action component refers to whether an individual behaves according to their true self. Kernis (2003) describes behaving authentically as “acting in accord with one's values, preferences, and needs as opposed to acting merely to please others or to attain rewards or avoid punishments through acting falsely” (p. 14). The final component of relational authenticity considers the importance of allowing others to “see the real you, good and bad” and, to this end, it is about being genuine when interacting with others and not fake (Kernis, 2003, p. 16). What is not advanced in Kernis' (2003) work is the explicit notion of morality and ethics; indeed, the “most influential thinkers of authenticity tend to consider authenticity as morally neutral” (Gardner et al., 2021, Letter 4, p. 21). As we alluded above, a comparison of the authentic leadership construct (Walumbwa et al., 2008) with Kernis (2003) yields both similarities and differences (see Table 1). In terms of similarities, the component of self-awareness is a core aspect of authentic leadership's operationalization and Kernis' (2003) theory of authentic functioning. In terms of differences, the first two modifications made by Walumbwa et al. (2008) largely arose from Avolio and Gardner (2005) and were relatively minor updates to Kernis' (2003) terminology. The first modification was that they adopted the term “balanced processing” to reflect leaders' information processing capabilities instead of Kernis' (2003) term “unbiased processing” (see Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 317). A second modification involved Walumbwa et al. (2008) changing Kernis' (2003) term “relational authenticity” to “relational transparency” to better capture how leaders and followers are thought to openly and transparently share information (see Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 317). No change Terminology change (minor) Walumbwa and colleagues believed using the term “balanced processing” instead of “unbiased processing” portrayed authentic leaders and followers' information processing capabilities with greater theoretical accuracy. Rather than asserting leaders and followers are devoid of cognitive biases, Walumbwa and colleagues proposed that leaders and followers can consider various aspects of a problem as they assess information in a reasonably balanced way (Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 317). Terminology change (minor) Walumbwa and colleagues believed using the term “relational transparency” instead of “relational authenticity” better illustrated the information sharing process. They found it more reflective of the straightforward and candid way that leaders and followers are thought to share information (Avolio & Gardner, 2005, p. 317). Theoretical change (major) Walumbwa and colleagues renamed Kernis' action component and introduced a new component called “internalized moral perspective.” They formed internalized moral perspective by merging two components from extant authentic leadership research: (a) internalized regulation and (b) positive moral perspective (Gardner et al., 2011, p. 1123). The decision to rename the action component of Kernis' work had a profound theoretical effect because it disconnected positive authentic leadership from its existential philosophical roots. Unlike the first two modifications involving terminology, a third modification by Walumbwa et al. (2008) arguably reflects a much larger theoretical departure from Kernis' (2003) authenticity conceptualization. Specifically, Walumbwa et al. (2008) dropped Kernis' (2003) authentic action component and introduced internalized moral perspective, which was not in Kernis' initial work. Walumbwa et al. (2008) seemingly downplayed this decision, and Gardner et al. (2011) minimize the theoretical implications of the new facet as well, describing internalized moral perspective's introduction as a mere “renam[ing]” of Kernis' (2003) action component “to better reflect the leader's commitment to core ethical values” (p. 1123). And while the developers of the authentic leadership construct continue to maintain that “the four components of authentic leadership were derived from Michael Kernis' (2003) multi-component conceptualization” (Gardner et al., 2021, Letter 1, p. 3), the result from swapping Kernis' action component for internalized moral perspective has received strong criticism (e.g., Alvesson & Einola, 2019). In fact, on closer inspection, the introduction of the internalized moral perspective facet prompts two related issues of concern. The first issue is recasting the action component from Kernis' (2003) framework disconnected the authenticity aspect of the authentic leadership construct (and measure) from its existential origins. This is because the action component of authenticity, in particular, leveraged key concepts from Sartre and Heidegger's existential philosophy. Kernis and Goldman (2006) cited Sartre and Heidegger specifically when discussing the theoretical underpinnings of authentic behavior, suggesting that actions “… are freely chosen with a sense of agency” (p. 292). Further connecting their action component to existential tenets, Kernis and Goldman (2006) highlighted Sartre's belief that “people's way of ‘being’ is inextricably linked to their choices” (p. 291). A result of removing “actions” from authentic leadership's four-part framework was that Walumbwa et al. (2008), in effect, dismissed Sartre and Heidegger's contributions and thereby created an authentic leadership construct that departed from its existential origins. The inherent disconnect between existential tenets and how authentic leadership is currently conceptualized has led scholars to conclude that presenting, “authentic leadership as a (measurable) construct that builds on the thinking of these philosophers, and to portray it as some sort of modern-day advancement of their works, is misleading” (Gardner et al., 2021, Letter 2, p. 7, emphasis in original). A second and related issue arises with the addition of internalized moral perspective to authentic leadership's conceptualization and measurement. In short, by explicitly including the notion of morality and ethics, Walumbwa et al. (2008) outright rejected the long-held notion that authentic behavior is morally and ethically neutral (see Gardner et al., 2005). They assert that given the potential impact a leader's actions can have on the lives of others, an “advanced level of moral development is a requirement for the achievement of leader authenticity” (Walumbwa et al., 2008, p. 93). The underlying premise being authentic leaders invoke their positive moral perspective and high ethical standards to guide decision making and behavior. This integration of morality and ethics into the authentic leadership construct has, however, been the subject of much debate insofar as morality considerations “… are not derived directly from the concept of authenticity” (Shamir & Eilam, 2005, p. 398). Indeed, some scholars are concerned that the morality assumption is too far removed from authenticity's theoretical origins. Recall that, philosophically speaking, authenticity is divorced from ethics in that an authentic action does not necessarily mean it is an ethical one (Algera & Lips-Wiersma, 2012; Qu et al., 2019; Zander, 2013). It is believed that a leader's actions can be “true to self” without complying with normative standards. In fact, if a leader “falls” and thus decides to conform to the influence of the Other, who constructed these moral or ethical standards (e.g., societal, group, or firm expectations, and pressures), then they are acting inauthentically. Interestingly, Kernis and Goldman (2006) proposed that when a leader's core feelings and values oppose normative standards, then authenticity will manifest as short-term conflict affecting their overall functioning and well-being. For instance, when leaders act “falsely” distressing emotions typically ensue, which have been empirically linked with numerous physiological and psychological difficulties as well as poorer performance (e.g., Grandey, 2003). Perhaps, in part, it is for this reason that Shamir and Eilam (2005), among others, have theorized that “Authentic leaders do not fake their leadership … Nor do they work on developing an image or persona” because when they enact a leadership role “… authentic leaders are being themselves (as opposed to conforming to others' expectations)” (pp. 396–397). One might reasonably conclude that there is little left to debate regarding the validity of the authentic leadership construct as developed by Walumbwa et al. (2008). To do so, however, would contradict the extent to which authentic leadership is operationalized using the ALQ. Indeed, the prevalence and scope of authentic leadership research is expanding—Gardner and Karam's (non-exhaustive) review identified 128 published articles since 2010 with scholars using diverse samples (e.g., Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, Germany, Greece, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, and Taiwan) domains (e.g., business, education, medicine, military, politics, and sports) and methodologies (e.g., laboratory, field, quasi-experiments) to expand the scholarly conversation (see Gardner et al., 2021). Given this increased interest, it is surprising that few (if any) studies have empirically explored the issues identified in the section above. Ergo, in the exploratory empirical endeavor that follows, we determine whether authenticity is, in fact, infused into the authentic leadership construct (developed by Walumbwa et al., 2008). Specifically, we sought to explore a key, unresolved theoretical issue—that is, can Sartre and Heidegger's philosophical contributions inform how researchers currently study the phenomenon of authentic leadership? Existential philosophy explicitly acknowledges the importance of authenticity's theoretical tie to a leader's action and choice. Sartre (1999) uses the example of a coward where a person is not a coward because of some physiological predisposition but becomes a coward as a result of their choices and actions. Therefore, a person is perceived as a coward because they have acted cowardly. The implication for authentic leadership is that a person simply does not come into this world as an authentic leader but rather becomes one by acting authentically. Research Question 1: Is the lack of existential development problematic for the authentic leadership construct's theoretical underpinnings? Do existential ideologies from key philosophical thinkers including Sartre and Heidegger add meaningful information over and above the current authentic leadership construct? Data were collected via Prolific Academic. When conducting research on authentic leadership, two perspectives are available to scholars: (a) the self-referential approach, wherein individuals (leaders) provide self-ascriptive information and (b) the relational approach, wherein other stakeholders' (subordinates) perceptions of a target individual's behavior are considered. Following the predominant approach in existing research, we developed our study using a relational lens. Hence, participants responded to an online survey asking them to think about their recent interactions with their immediate supervisor and answer a series of questions. Of the 250 individuals who completed the survey, we received useable data from 245 participants (98%), who were paid $2.75. Three participants were removed because they incorrectly answered a quality control item, and two participants were removed because they incorrectly answered a comprehension item related to authenticity (described below). All participants lived in the United States, were 20+ years old, employed (not self-employed), and regularly interacted with their supervisor. Participants averaged 34 years of age (SD = 9.3) and 39 h of work per week (SD = 9.4), and 51% were male. A majority of participants indicated they have been reporting to their supervisor for 2 years or more (51%) and interact with their supervisor at least once a day to many times a day (53.1%). We used Walumbwa et al.'s (2008) ALQ. 5 Participants were told to think about their immediate supervisor at work and judge the extent to which the following behaviors fit with their leadership style (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach's alpha = .93. Participants were told to continue to think about interactions with their immediate supervisor when answering this set of questions. They were told, however, to base their responses on their perceptions of their supervisor's authenticity. The survey design then provided participants with a brief definition and examples of (in)authenticity. Next, participants completed two comprehension questions: “Do you understand what authenticity is” (yes/no) and “An authentic behavior is genuine, meaning that it reflects your supervisor's core beliefs and nature” (true/false). Finally, participants judged the extent to which the behaviors comprising the ALQ, when enacted by their supervisor, were authentic in nature. To illustrate, “If/when my direct supervisor … [insert ALQ behavior here] this behavior (1 = is not at all consistent with his/her values and beliefs; 4 = accurately reflects his/her true nature and beliefs).” Cronbach's alpha = .94. We included various affective, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes to more fully explore the role of authenticity when studying the authentic leadership construct. Unless otherwise noted, a 5-point Likert response scale was used (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). To begin, we felt that affect-based trust (α = .86, three-items; McAllister, 1995) and cognition-based trust (α = .86, three-items; McAllister, 1995) were theoretically appropriate criteria to investigate. We also assessed the extent to which participants liked their supervisor (α = .94, r = .89, two-items; Brown & Keeping, 2005). In addition, we explored participants' organizational cynicism (α = .72, r = .56, two-items; Johnson & O'Leary-Kelly, 2003) and psychological contract breach (α = .79, three-items; Robinson & Morrison, 2000) beliefs, as well as their job satisfaction (α = .89, r = .80, two-items; Brayfield & Rothe, 1951). Finally, we believed task performance (α = .87, three-items; Williams & Anderson, 1991) and organizational citizenship behaviors (α = .79, three-items; Williams & Anderson, 1991), two of the most focal criteria in management and applied psychology, were important to investigate. Following Schoorman and Mayer (2008), we asked participants for their supervisor's assessment of their performance and extra-role behaviors rather than their own assessment. This “common perspective” approach corresponds more closely with supervisors' appraisals of their employees than a direct perspective (i.e., the participa