The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations
arxiv(2023)
摘要
We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence
of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the
auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to
logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's
transparency, which controls the amount of information on competing bids
disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under
different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed variants) on
the environment generating the bidder's valuations and competing bids. These
minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of
the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price
auctions.
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