Supply chain coordination mechanisms of coal power enterprises under renewable energy quota system: A perspective of game analysis

The renewable energy quota system has become an important policy tool for countries around the world to solve the differences in renewable energy resource endowments between regions and promote the transformation of energy structure. How to coordinate the supply chain of power generation enterprises from the micro level of enterprises has become a key issue to ensure the implementation of renewable energy quota system. By con-structing a game analysis model, this research studied the coordination game problem between the supply chain of coal power enterprises and renewable energy enterprises, and compared and analyzed the differences in decision-making between centralized and decentralized situations. The results illustrate that in the case of centralized decision-making, although renewable energy enterprises and coal power enterprises can guarantee profits and carbon emission reduction effects. However, in the real situation of independent rational economic man, it is difficult to ensure the real realization of centralized decision-making. Further, the research proposed that in the case of decentralized decision-making, the negotiation mechanisms of revenue sharing, cost allocation, and revenue sharing + cost allocation were used to solve the supply chain coordination problem of renewable energy enterprises and coal power enterprises. The equilibrium solution of the game model under different negotiation mechanisms is obtained. Finally, the results of theoretical analysis were verified by practical examples and the corresponding sensitivity analysis is carried out. The conclusion has decision-making reference value for solving the coordination problem between coal power enterprises and renewable energy enterprises, improving the overall income of supply chain and carbon emission reduction, and effectively promoting the implementation of renewable energy quota system.