Automated Detection of Under-Constrained Circuits in Zero-Knowledge Proofs

As zero-knowledge proofs gain increasing adoption, the cryptography community has designed domainspecific languages (DSLs) that facilitate the construction of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). Many of these DSLs, such as Circom, facilitate the construction of arithmetic circuits, which are essentially polynomial equations over a finite field. In particular, given a program in a zero-knowledge proof DSL, the compiler automatically produces the corresponding arithmetic circuit. However, a common and serious problem is that the generated circuit may be underconstrained, either due to a bug in the program or a bug in the compiler itself. Underconstrained circuits admit multiple witnesses for a given input, so a malicious party can generate bogus witnesses, thereby causing the verifier to accept a proof that it should not. Because of the increasing prevalence of such arithmetic circuits in blockchain applications, several million dollars worth of cryptocurrency have been stolen due to underconstrained arithmetic circuits. Motivated by this problem, we propose a new technique for finding ZKP bugs caused by underconstrained polynomial equations over finite fields. Our method performs semantic reasoning over the finite field equations generated by the compiler to prove whether or not each signal is uniquely determined by the input. Our proposed approach combines SMT solving with lightweight uniqueness inference to effectively reason about underconstrained circuits. We have implemented our proposed approach in a tool called QED2 and evaluate it on 163 Circom circuits. Our evaluation shows that QED2 can successfully solve 70% of these benchmarks, meaning that it either verifies the uniqueness of the output signals or finds a pair of witnesses that demonstrate non-uniqueness of the circuit. Furthermore, QED2 has found 8 previously unknown vulnerabilities in widelyused circuits.