An anti-collusion attack defense method for physical layer key generation scheme based on transmission delay

Physical layer security (PLS) is considered one of the most promising solutions to solve the security problems of massive Internet of Things (IoTs) devices because of its lightweight and high efficiency. Significantly, the recent physical layer key generation (PLKG) scheme based on transmission delay proposed by Huang et al. (2021) does not have any restrictions on communication methods and can extend the traditional physical layer security based on wireless channels to the whole Internet scene. However, the secret-sharing strategy adopted in this scheme has hidden dangers of collusion attack, which may lead to security problems such as information tampering and privacy disclosure. By establishing a probability model, this article quantitatively analyzes the relationship between the number of malicious collusion nodes and the probability of key exposure, which proves the existence of this security problem. In order to solve the problem of collusion attack in Huang et al.'s scheme, this article proposes an anti-collusion attack defense method, which minimizes the influence of collusion attack on key security by optimizing parameters including the number of the middle forwarding nodes, the random forwarding times, the time delay measurement times and the out-of-control rate of forwarding nodes. Finally, based on the game model, we prove that the defense method proposed in this article can reduce the risk of key leakage to zero under the scenario of the "Careless Defender" and "Cautious Defender" respectively.