Fair Energy Allocation in Risk-aware Energy Communities

This work introduces a decentralized mechanism for the fair and efficient allocation of limited renewable energy sources (RESs) among consumers in an energy community. In the proposed non-cooperative game, the self-interested community members independently decide whether to compete or not for access to RESs during peak hours and shift their loads analogously. In the peak hours, a proportional allocation policy is used to allocate the limited RESs among them. The existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) or dominant strategies in this non-cooperative game is shown, and closed-form expressions of the renewable energy demand and social cost are derived. Moreover, a decentralized algorithm for choosing consumers' strategies that lie on NE states is designed. The work shows that the risk attitude of the consumers can have a significant impact on the deviation of the induced social cost from the optimal. Besides, the proposed decentralized mechanism is shown to attain a much lower social cost than one using the naive equal sharing policy.