Coordination Mechanism of Village-Level Industrial Park Transformation Based on the Perspective of Stakeholders: A Case Study of Heshan City, Guangdong Province

Interest relationship is are the most basic among all social relations. In the field of urban renewal, the game process, conflict mechanism, and coordination mechanism among multiple stakeholders are important issues for cities to improve their sustainability. The stakeholders involved in the transformation of village-level industrial parks are more diverse, the interest differentiation is more frequent, and interest conflicts are more intense. The existing research mainly tries to explore the status quo, mode strategy and interest game in the transformation process of village industrial park from the aspects of power, system and space, and points out the importance of interest balance among "land stakeholders" such as government, market and property owners, but there are still deficiencies in the multi-subject participation mechanism and interest coordination mechanism. Due to the lack of advantages in location value, public finance and industry introduction, peripheral cities in the Pearl River Delta represented by Jiangmen are unable to ensure the positive guidance of spatial value remodeling and the full expression of diverse interests, resulting in slow progress of the reconstruction. Therefore, based on the stakeholder perspective of the urban regime theory, and constructing the multi-scale and multi-subject analytical framework of "stakeholder identification-interest conflict analysis-interest mechanism coordination,"the stakeholders in the upgrading of the village industrial park in Heshan City were investigated through a literature review, expert rating, and questionnaire interview. This study examines the practical problems of the village industrial park in Heshan City, Guangdong Province,to identify the stakeholders, interest demands, and conflicts involved in the transformation of the aforementioned. Subsequently, combined with typical park reconstruction cases, the interest game process of core stakeholders such as government departments, state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, financial institutions, village collectives, and villagers is discussed.Additionally, the evolutionary path and micro-mechanism framework of the formation of diversified interest alliances, the achievement of diversified goals, and the coordination of multi-subject interests are revealed in this process. Research shows the main constraints to the implementation of village-level industrial parks are the unequal power of stakeholders, unfair participation of power, unreasonable benefit distribution, and compensation mechanism. The participant-subjects and related capital input, source and income, collaborative transformation of industry and space, as well as the responsibility and power relationship of the implementation subject are more complex. In turn, government departments such as the Finance Bureau and the Bureau of Natural Resources are forced to form formal or informal partnerships with developers, enterprises and original owners. In the less developed areas of the Pearl River Delta, the mode of "government-led plusdiversified participation"is usually adopted. By entrusting full power to governmental financial organizations such as the Finance Bureau and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, village collectives and villagers are united with developers, operators, and financial institutions to form formal and informal cooperation relations, such as government-village and government-enterprise alliances, as well as interest distribution and incentive mechanisms. Additionally, the achievement of political, economic, social, and ecological diversification goals is promoted.Finally, this study proposes the following areas for future research: First, research on the micro behavior decision-making and mechanism of the village industrial park reconstruction can be conducted to further explore the "institutional space" of the reconstruction and its incentive and constraint mechanismto reveal the underlying"power-capital-space"and the political economic logic behind it. Second, against the background of multiple driving factors, there are also significant differences in the form, process, and mechanism of cooperation between the interest subjects of the village-level industrial park transformation. The differences in the main subjects in different modes, their temporal and spatial effects, and the mechanisms of action need to be further explored. Finally, the study investigates the social and cultural spatial response, governance path, and subject initiative of the village industrial park transformation, and reveals the possible ways in which village collectives and farmers' active social spatial practicescan improve their own situation through the logic of spatial governance.