Fully Continuous Leakage-Resilient Certificate-Based Signcryption Scheme for Mobile Communications

Due to the popularity of mobile communication, many computing devices are exposed to remote environments without physical protection so that these devices easily suffer from leakage attacks (e.g., side-channel attacks). Under such leakage attacks, when a computing device performs some cryptographic algorithm, an adversary may acquire partial bits of secret keys participated in this cryptographic algorithm. To resist leakage attacks, researchers offer leakage-resilient cryptog-raphy as a solution. A signcryption scheme combines signing and encrypting processes to simulta-neously provide both authentication and confidentiality, which is an important cryptographic prim-itive. Indeed, many leakage-resilient signcryption schemes under various public key system (PKS) settings were proposed. Unfortunately, these schemes still have two shortcomings, namely, bounded leakage resilience and conditionally continuous leakage resilience. In this paper, a "fully" contin-uous leakage-resilient certificate-based signcryption (FCLR-CBSC) scheme is proposed. Security analysis is formally proved to show that our scheme possesses both authentication and confidential-ity against two types of adversaries in the certificate-based PKS setting. Performance analysis and simulation experience show that our scheme is suited to run on both a PC and a mobile device.