Does friendship stem from altruism? adam smith and the distinction between love-based and interest-based preferences

Friendship-and-love expresses musings about well-being-while the object of the musings, i.e., "well-being," is the economist's substantive satisfaction. Insofar as altruism is about well-being and not the musings, it cannot be subsumed under friendship-and-love. However, what is the basis of the difference between the economist's substantive satisfaction and friendship-and-love? The answer can be found in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, chapter 2: how "mutual sympathy" differs from substantive satisfaction. Smith scholars generally miss the uniqueness of "mutual sympathy" and, indeed, fold it under Smith's "sympathy" (and "empathy")-with one exception. Robert Sugden highlights the uniqueness of mutual sympathy. However, he goes to the other end, that is, he folds Smith's sympathy-and-empathy under mutual sympathy. This paper aims to avoid the folding in either direction. Indeed, it argues that each fellow-feeling deals with a question that is orthogonal to the other. Mutual sympathy originates love-based sociality (friendship-and-love), which can be juxtaposed to interest-based sociality, i.e., substantive satisfaction, such as altruism. These genera of sociality are about the nature of satisfaction or preferences, and hence in contrast to sympathy-and-empathy that are basically about judgments. As judgments, sympathy-and-empathy are ultimately about the nature of decision making, irrespective of whether the decisions concerning love-based or interest-based preferences.