Berth Allocation at Passenger Terminals Using Auctions

In this paper, we compare a multi-round, second-price, sealed-bid bundle auction and a single-item, sequential, second-price, sealed-bid auction for berth slot leasing for vessels (roll-on/roll-off passenger vessels and/or cruise ships) at a public marine terminal. The bundle auction mechanism is designed to maximize port operator profits by auctioning berth (time) slots in groups. The framework is tested using simulation by varying: the number of roll-on/roll-off passenger/cruise ship operating companies; the number of slots they bid for; and the mechanism design with regards to the winner determination, slot valuation, and max to min slot bid ratio among the bidders. The results indicate that neither auction type is a clear winner, and depending on the assumptions, a terminal operator should choose one over the other. The results from this study can be used by terminal operators, given their knowledge and/or assumptions on slot valuations and demand, to select a winner-determination policy and the minimum number of slots they allow players to bid for when designing the auction of their berth capacity to maximize their profits.