Retailer’s optimal CSR investment in closed-loop supply chains: the impacts of supply chain structure and channel power structure

This paper studies the retailer’s optimal corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment decisions in manufacturer-collecting closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). We establish a centralized and two decentralized models with and without considering the retailer’s CSR investment. The impacts of the supply chain structure and channel power structure on the retailer’s CSR investment decisions are analyzed. We find that (i) the retailer increases CSR investment as the remanufacturing cost savings increase or the collection cost reduces; (ii) the retailer is more willing to make a CSR investment in the centralized model than in the decentralized models; (iii) the CSR effort level in the manufacturer-led model is higher than that in the retailer-led model; and (iv) when the unit cost of CSR investment is moderate, retailer’s CSR investment benefits the retailer while harming the manufacturer; however, CSR investment always leads to a “win–win” situation when the retailer is the channel leader. Finally, we carry out numerical studies to investigate the effects of model parameters on supply chain equilibrium.