The differential fault analysis on block cipher KLEIN-96

KLEIN is a new family of lightweight block ciphers designed for resource-constrained devices. Compared to other schemes, it also has great advantages in both software and hardware performances. In recent works, many researchers have studied its security against differential fault analysis (DFA). Note that all the works only focused on the scheme KLEIN-64, which only has 64 bits key length. In fact, the 64-bit's security is obviously not enough for the current ciphers. In this paper, we investigate the differential fault attack on the key schedule of KLEIN-96, which has 96 bits key length. More specifically, by deeply developing the inner-relationship of input-output differentials for its S-box, we reduce the complexity of exhaustive searching from the original 296 to an acceptable boundary by injecting a certain number of byte-faults. Finally, we also demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed attack by simulations, which show that our method has great advantages over other cryptanalysis on KLEIN cipher.